These plaintiffs have pled an “injury in fact,” if nothing else, based on the termination of their leases and the continuation of the redevelopment plan. Moreover, the Village’s standing argument disregards several aspects of the relief being sought by these plaintiffs. Although the Village acknowledges in its reply papers that the plaintiffs are also seeking an order compelling the Village to approve affordable housing, an order compelling the Village to take or fund steps to remedy the effects of the past discrimination, a declaration that the Village’s conduct violated the FHA, and compensatory and
punitive damages, it contends that the plaintiffs have been made whole by the Fairfield
settlement. It is clear that neither of the original plaintiffs, nor the three new plaintiffs, believe they have been made whole; collectively the plaintiffs are still seeking monetary damages.
Accordingly, this court finds that the plaintiffs have adequately pled a particularized injury by the Village that, if remedied by the court, will bring them redress, and thus, have standing to pursue this suit.
B. Motion To Dismiss For Failure to State A Claim
1. Applicable Law
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007), the Supreme Court rejected
the “oft-quoted” standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 (1957), that a complaint should not be dismissed, “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. at 45-46. The court discarded the “no set of facts” language in favor of the requirement that plaintiff plead enough facts “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1974. The “plausibility” language used by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic has not been interpreted by the Second Circuit to require a “universal standard of heightened fact pleading,” but to require a complaint to “amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.” Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2007) emphasis in original). Further, courts have noted that while heightened factual pleading is not the new order of the day, Bell Atlantic holds that a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Williams v. Berkshire Fin. Grp. Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 320, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1959).
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