III. DISCUSSION
A. The Village’s Standing Argument
The court must first address the Village’s challenge to the plaintiffs’ standing. See Fair
Hous. in Huntington Comm., Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 316 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 2003)(citing Untied States v. Cambio Exacto, S.A., 166 F.3d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 1999)(whether claimant has standing is a threshold question in every federal case). “Standing under the FHA, . . . is coextensive with Article III standing . . . [T]o bring [a FHA] suit, a plaintiff must meet only ‘the Art. III minima of injury in fact: that the plaintiff allege that as a result of the defendant’s actions he has suffered a distinct and palpable injury.’” Id. at 362. The Village argues that the plaintiffs lack standing because (1) they cannot demonstrate that their injury, namely, the lack of affordable housing, is related to the Village’s conduct and (2) they cannot show that they will benefit in any
way if the relief they seek is granted. Accepting as true the allegations in the amended
complaint, the Village’s standing arguments lacks merit. To begin with, the Village disregarded several of the plaintiffs’ allegations when it argued that the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that their injury is traceable to the Village’s conduct. In its supporting papers, the Village states that “Fairfield and Secatogue, two private concerns, negotiated a deal at arms length for the sale of the building” and the only reference in the amended complaint to any action taken by the Village is that it issued a building permit. Def. Mem at 3. Contrary to this characterization, the plaintiffs have alleged that the Village, acting
with discriminatory animus, initiated the Secatogue Avenue Redevelopment Plan, authorized the preparation of the feasability studies, prepared environmental impact statements, and even solicited the ultimate developer that terminated the plaintiff’s leases. Amended Complaint at 31-32. While the Village may ultimately prove that it “had nothing to do with the actions of [the] private developer to renovate a poorly maintained building,” see Reply at 2, this standing challenge, which relies on the factual underpinnings of the suit, must be rejected at this stage in 6 the proceedings. See Fair Housing in Huntington Comm., Inc., 316 F.3d at 361.The Village’s standing argument, based on the speculative nature of the relief being sought, also fails. Essentially, the Village contends that the relief sought by the plaintiffs can only be achieved in the legislative branch, not through the courts. In this regard, the Village argues that the plaintiffs would not benefit even if they obtained an order compelling it to approve an affordable housing plan and enjoining it from taking further steps toward redevelopment or from engaging in discriminatory practices or policies. The Village insists that there is no contractor or developer prepared to build the housing the plaintiffs seek, and thus,
“[e]ach of the requests is based on nothing more than speculation and possibility.” Def. Mem. At 7-8. In support of this “speculation” argument, the Village directs this court to Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) and Hope, Inc. v. County of DuPage, 738 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1984). In Warth, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because none of the plaintiffs had a present interest in the property and their desire to live in the area was dependent on the actions of third party developers. Specifically, the Warth court held that the prospective plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that absent the alleged unconstitutional acts, there was a substantial probability that they would have found adequate low or moderate income housing. Warth, 422 U.S. at 504. Similarly in Hope, the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they failed to establish that any proposed projects for low income housing were in any way impeded by an act of the County Board or that there were third parties willing to build
low income housing. See Hope, Inc., 738 F.2d at 806-07. The individuals in this case are in an entirely different position than the individuals in 7 Warth and Hope. In this case, the plaintiffs are not potential residents needing to show that there is a contractor prepared to build low income housing, the plaintiffs were already living in affordable housing that was allegedly eliminated due to the illegal discriminatory actions of the defendants.
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